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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Petition for Review is from a final Order of the Industrial Commission, 
State of Utah dated May 12, 1994. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
35-1-86 UCA, as amended, Section 63-46b-14, 16 k 17 UCA 1953, as amended and Section 
78-2a-3(2)(a) UCA 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding no medical causation 
between the surgery of July 27, 1989 and the industrial accident of September 15, 
1982? Substantial Evidence Test. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 
63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
II. Whether the Industrial Commission erred in ignoring competent, 
uncontroverted medical evidence, i.e. Dr. Charles R. Smith's finding, and that of 
the consulting medical panel in the Medicaid consideration, that the problem related 
to the original 1982 problem? Correction of Error Test. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) 
III. Whether the Industrial Commission, in the circumstances of the present 
case, erroneously concluded the activity of Moving the 'parking block' was unusual 
and extraordinary exertion? Substantial Evidence Test. Grace Drilling Co* v. Board 
of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
IV. Whether the Industrial Commission failed to interpret and apply the law 
and resolve doubt in accordance with the mandate of the Appellate Courts of this 
State to do so liberally in favor of the employee? Correction of Error Test. 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
35-1-45 UCA, 1953, as amended. Provides for compensation of Industrial 
injuries. 
35-1-65 UCA, 1953, as amended. Provides for payment of temporary total 
disability benefits* 
35-1-81 UCA, 1953, as amended. Provides for payment of medical expenses 
related to an industrial injury. 
Allen v, Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Provides for both 
legal and medical causation effects of an injury. 
Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Commission, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992. Where the industrial injury is the significant contributing event a 
subsequent aggravation by a non-industrial event will not prevent recovery. 
Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Provides 
the effect must be significantly connected to the event. 
Baker v. California Packing Corp., 244 P. 2d 640 (Utah 1952). Provides the 
Commission cannot ignore competent, credible, uncontested evidence. 
Ogden City v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 193 P. 857 (Utah 1920). The law 
should be liberally construed in favor of the injured workman and in case there is 
any doubt respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the employe. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for workers' compensation benefits. Petitioner seeks review 
of the Industrial Commission's denial of Motion for Review which was filed July 26, 
1993 and ruled upon by the Commission on May 12, 1994 sustaining the administrative 
Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of June 28, 1993. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Charles Keith was injured in an industrial accident on September 15, 1982 
during the course of his employment with R. P. Scherer Corporation. He received 
medical benefits, temporary total benefits and permanent partial benefits based on 
an impairment of 15% whole man. These were paid by the employer's insurer. 
Fireman's Fund. 
On June 11, 1985 Mr. Keith had a second industrial accident while in the 
employ of Salt Lake County. After hearing before an Administrative Law Judge and 
referral, evaluation and report by a medical panel, it was determined that the June 
11, 1985 accident temporally aggravated the 1982 injury, but caused no additional 
permanent injury or aggravation of his 1982 injuries. He received temporary total 
disability benefits and limited medical benefits. 
The foregoing facts are uncontested and records and documents supporting them 
were not included by the Industrial Commission in the Record on appeal. 
In July, 1988 Mr. Keith assisted his mother in moving and later assisted his 
two teenage sons in moving a concrete parking bumper. (Tr. page 20, lines 9-21 -
Record page 208; Tr pages 38 & 39 - Record 226 & 227 line 25 on page 226 - line 4 
on page 227) His activity consisted of placing a bar under the block and 'scooting' 
it into position. (Tr. page 20, lines 9-21 - Record page 208) The next day he 
began to experience an exacerbation of his back pain. (Record page 10 - "He did not 
have acute, immediate pain then but he did have pain the following day at which time 
he went in to the Emergency Room and was seen by Dr. Hooker....") He was diagnosed 
by Dr. Charles M. Smith with a bulging disc at L5-S1 and a mild bulging of the disc 
at L4-5. This was the same area of his 1982 industrial injury. (Record page 10 and 
114). 
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The Employer and it's industrial carrier denied benefits based on the 1982 
injury. An attempt was made to obtain authorization for surgery through the 
Medicaid program. In response to inquiry, Dr. Charles M. Smith wrote to the State 
of Utah Dept. of Health on October 14, 1988 stating: "Having reviewed this patient's 
history, this appears to be secondary to the original problem". (Record pages 9, 108 
and 251) The State Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing then 
requested an Independent Medical Examination by Dr. Creig MacArthur. (Tr. page 30 -
Record page 218 - lines 16-19.) This was performed on October 26, 1988. (Tr. page 
118 and 248.) Thereafter on October 28, 1988 the State Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing, wrote to Mr. Keith stating: 
"On October 27, 1988 our panel of consulting physicians reviewed 
this request. It is their decision since this injury is secondary to 
the original problem it is the Industrial Commission's responsibility 
for payment. 
''Therefore, this request for Medicaid pavment authorization has 
been denied." (Record page 17) 
No independent medical evaluation was requested or obtained by the Employer, 
it's Insurance Company or their attorneys. No medical evidence or statement was 
filed or entered into the record contrary to Dr. Charles M. Smith's conclusions or 
the conclusions of the panel of consulting physicians used by the State Department 
of Health, which, since he did the IME for the State must surely have included Dr. 
MacArthur. 
Mr. Keith had not returned to work after the flare-up of his back in July, 
1988 as of the date of the hearing. (Tr. page 34 - Record page 222, lines 1 - 9 ) 
Surgery was eventually performed on July 27, 1989 (Tr page 31 - Record page 219 
lines 3-5) and Mr. Keith was given a projected return to work date of June 1, 1991. 
(Tr. 34 line 25 and page 35 line 1 - record 222 k 223). 
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During the surgery. Dr. Smith noted extensive adhesions around the prior 
surgery site (Record pages 112 and 246) and after the surgery changed his primary 
diagnosis to Adhesive Radiculitis. (Record pages 4, 111, 113, 256 and 273). 
Application for additional industrial benefits based on the original September 
15, 1982 accident was filed on September 7th, 1990 and an answer was duly filed. 
(Record pages 1 - 2 1 and 25 - 28). Hearing was held before an ALJ on this 
application on May 9, 1991. The issue to be determined at the hearing was as stated 
by the first ALJ in the original Summary of Testimony, Findings of Fact, Conclusion 
of Law and Order: 
"The primary issue to be resolved by the Administrative Law Judge 
is whether there is a causal relationship between the industrial 
accident and the surgery on September (sic), 1989, and if answered in 
the affirmative, the secondary issues of medical expenses and temporary 
total disability through September 15, 1990, the statutory cut off 
date, eight years after the industrial accident." (Record page 39). 
On November 6, 1991 (over a year after the hearing) the ALJ made Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order stating the Applicant, Mr. Charles Keith, was 
not credible and concluded: 
"In accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact, the ALJ 
hereby rules that the applicant, charles S. Keith, has failed to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of credible evidence that there is a 
causal connection between the industrial accident of September 15, 1982 
and the medical treatment received and the applicant's unavailability 
for work." (Record page 41). 
Mr. Keith's Counsel filed a Motion for Review December 6, 1991. (Record page 
42) On May 21, 1992 the Industrial Commission issued an Order of Remand directing 
the ALJ to review the record of the case in accordance with the decision in Adams 
v. Board of Review, 821 P 2d 1 (Utah App. 1991). (Record page 60). The ALJ did not 
act on the Remand for another year. Under date of May 18, 1993 the ALJ elected to 
submit the matter to a medical panel to resolve the "medical issues" in the case. 
(Record page 67), 
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At that point, on May 25, 1993, Mr. Keith's Counsel before the Commission 
filed a Motion to Recuse the ALJ. (Record page 73). 
The Motion to Recuse was granted by the Presiding Lav Judge and the case was 
reassigned to the ALJ who wrote the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
which the Commission adopted and which is the subject of this appeal. (Record page 
87) On June 28, 1993, the second ALJ concluded " [Tlhere is no conflict in the 
medical evidence." (Record page 91). He then proceeded to enter an order adverse 
to the Applicant/Petitioner, Charles Keith. (Record page 96). 
Mr. Keith's counsel before the Commission again filed a Motion for Review on 
July 26, 1993 (Record page 98) and on May 12, 1994 the Commission entered It's Order 
Denying Motion for Review, with one dissent. (Record page 151). From this Order 
appeal is taken in the form of Petition for Writ of Review dated June 8, 1994. 
(Record page 155). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Respondents argued and the Industrial Commission found, in a split 
decision, that the activity of moving the cement parking bumper rose to the level 
of legal causation. In doing so the Commission failed to address the issue of 
medical causation. The Respondents argued medical causation based on medical 
histories taken by the three health care providers envolved, but carefully avoided 
the conclusions of those providers. 
After evaluating the records. Dr. Charles Smith concluded the current problems 
were secondary to the original industrial injury. After evaluating the records and 
examining Mr. Keith Dr. Creig MacArthur reported to the State of Utah Dept. of 
Health and based on his report and that of Dr. Smith denied assistance for the 
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surgerv on the ground that it was necessitated by the original 1982 injury and was 
thus the responsibility of the "Industrial Commission"• 
Finallv, during the surgery, Dr. Smith noted and attempted to free up 
extensive adhesions in the site of the original surgerv. Following the surgery he 
changed his primary diagnosis to "Adhesive Radiculitis". 
Only two of the three health care providers expressed opinions as to medical 
causation. Both were in agreement that there was medical causation between the 
present problems and need for surgery and the original industrial injury in 1982. 
No medical "opinion" to the contrary can be found in the record. There is clearly 
a causal connection between the surgerv and the 1982 industrial injury and the 
Commission erred in not so finding. 
II. The onlv wav the Industrial Commission could arrive at the conclusion 
that there was a medically causal connection between the activities in Mr. Keith 
assisting his mother to move, and in moving the cement parking bumper, is to ignore 
the medical opinions of Dr. Charles Smith and the conclusions of the State of Utah 
Dept. of Health, arrived at with the assistance of Dr. Creig MacArthur. As stated 
in Point I there was no medical opinion to the contrary expressed by any health Care 
provider. The Respondents argue from, and the ALJ based his findings on, selective 
excerpts from the medical records, in the most part created by Drs Smith and 
MacArthur, and purport to reinterpret them so as to arrive at different conclusions 
than the medical experts while ignoring those experts' own interpretation of their 
own medical records. 
The Utah Courts have repeatedly ruled the Industrial Commission mav not ignore 
uncontroverted evidence. Here they have clearlv done so and that is error. 
III. The Respondents argue and two of the Industrial Commissioners 
erroneously accepted their argument that "scooting" the cement block was an "unusual 
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and extraordinary" activity. In concluding this activity rose to the level of 
"legal causation" under the Allen decision the Commission confused the terminology 
with the activity. It is conceded that the activity was unusual and extraordinary. 
Few of us would ever be called upon to move such an object. 
The question however is whether or not the activity required unusual and 
extraordinary exertion. The ALJ erroneously concluded it did because it "required" 
a man and two boys to move it. Oddlv enough there is no evidence in the record as 
to the weight or size of the cement parking bumper. It is at least as consistent 
with the facts to conclude that Mr. Keith used the bar and obtained the assistance 
of his two sons, both teen agers, to make sure he did not exert himself beyond his 
physical capabilities. It was undoubtedly the method he used and the assistance 
which caused Dr. Smith to conclude he was engaged in normal activities of daily 
living at least as far as exertion was concerned. 
Considering the method employed and the assistance utilized there can be no 
serious claim that Mr. Keith exceeded his capabilities in view of his physical 
restrictions and the Commission erred in concluding that he did. 
IV. Where there are two equally plausible interpretations of a situation 
such as noted in Point III above, there is certainly doubt. Here the Commission 
assumed, without supporting evidence as to the actual difficulty in moving the 
cement bumper, that the use of the bar and assistance of two teenage boys was 
because the task required that amount of assistance and still resulted in unusual 
and extraordinary exertion. 
Mr. Keith clearly testified he was avoiding exertion bevond his capabilities. 
With the use of the bar and his two sons the exertion of the task was minimized. 
Even if evidence were tendered by the Respondents that the cement bumper was 
extraordinarily heavy and required substantial effort to move, by using the bar and 
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his two sons the task required no greater exertion than other common activities of 
every day living. Certainly this interpretation of the facts is just as reasonable 
as those made by the Commission. Based on the ALJ's view of the matter there was 
clearly an element of doubt. Such doubt should, by law, be resolved in favor of Mr. 
Keith and the Commission erred in not doing so. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING NO MEDICAL 
CAUSATION BETWEEN THE SURGERY OF JULY 27, 1989 AND THE 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1982 
Under Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, (Utah 1986) there are two 
causal tests which must be met: Legal and Medical. In order to rise to the level 
of a compensable accident an incident must meet both of these causal requirements. 
At the same time it is clear that an intervening event, whether industrial or non-
industrial, must meet the Medical causation, as well as the Legal causation 
requisite before it will interrupt the causal chain and cut off the statutory 
responsibility of the Employer and it's Insurance Carrier. See IHC v* Board of 
Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992) and Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 
954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The ALJ found and two of the Commissioners concurred that moving the cement 
bumper rose to the level of Legal causation. The ALJ glossed over the issue of 
medical causation and the Commission failed to address it. 
The Respondents argued from selective statements taken out of context from the 
medical histories of the three health care providers envolved, but failed to 
acknowledge their conclusions as to causation. The first doctor seen by Mr. Keith 
was Dr. Keith Hooker at the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Emergency Center. 
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At no time did doctor Hooker express an opinion as to causal connection or lack 
thereof to the 1982 industrial accident. 
The only other doctor seen, other than the treating physician, was Dr. Creig 
MacArthur. Mr. Keith was evaluated by Dr. MacArthur at the request of the State 
Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing. When the Employer's 
insurance carrier denied responsibility for the surgery application was made for 
medicaid assistance. The Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing 
ruled against that application following Dr. MacArthur's evaluation. The Division 
of Health Care Financing wrote Mr. Keith as follows: 
"On October 27, 1988 our panel of consulting physicians reviewed this 
request. It is their decision since this injury is secondary to the 
original problem it is the Industrial Commission's responsibility for 
payment. 
"Therefore, this request for Medicaid payment authorization has been 
denied." 
Thus, although the Respondents take portions of Dr. MacArthur's notes out of 
context and interpret them to their own advantage. Dr. MacArthur obviously advised 
the Division of Health Care Financing that Mr. Keith's need for surgery was causally 
connected to the original industrial injury and not to any activity associated with 
assisting in his mother's move or moving the cement bumper out of the way. Dr. 
MacArthur would certainly be in a better position to interpret his own notes than 
the Respondents. 
The treating physician was Dr. Charles Smith. In his notes on August 9, 1988 
he stated: 
"A review of medical records from 1982 onward will be carried out when 
they are received from Fireman's Insurance Fund, to determine whether 
or not this constitutes a new injury or is simply an injury secondary 
to the original problem" 
This August 9, 1988 note appears three times in the Record - pages 10, 119 and 253. 
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In an unprecedented circumstance the Record, when delivered to Petitioner's 
Counsel contained several "Post-it Notes" apparently affixed by one of the ALJs. 
If the notes are those of the original ALJ, then his skepticism may well have 
influenced the second ALJ. If the notes were made by the second ALJ then it is 
obvious his review of the file was incomplete. All of the notes, which are now a 
part of the record, were negative in nature. The one quoted below was affixed to 
page 253 next to the above quoted statement. It reads as follows: 




The arrow pointed to the general area of the language quoted above. Doctor Smith 
answered this question five times in the record, ten times if you count the 
duplications. It is hard to understand how the ALJ would be able to miss the answer 
unless he had already prejudged the case and was not looking for it. 
In Dr. Smiths letter to the State of Utah Dept. of Health, Division of Health 
Care Financing dated October 14, 1988 he stated: "Having reviewed this patient's 
history, this appears to be secondary to the original problem." (e.a. ) Here he used 
the same terminology as in the question stated in his August 9, 1988 note, but here 
he is now making it as a statement. He is no longer in doubt. He has formed an 
opinion. This October 14, 1988 letter appears three times in the Record - on pages 
9, 108 and 251. 
Having failed to obtain authorization from Medicaid or the Industrial Carrier, 
Dr. Smith prevailed on Utah Valley Hospital to allow him to do the surgery there 
without payment for the facility. The surgery was performed July 27, 1989. During 
the course of the surgery the doctor's "Operative " notes reflect the following: 
"Fairly extensive root adhesions were identified around the root on the 
left side, probably the L5 root. It was trapped in enough adhesions 
that substantial difficulty was encountered in attempting to free it 
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up. It was freed up and reflected away from the left side towards the 
midline and then the disk in that area was noted to be a small focal 
herniation underneath where the inherent root had been trapped.... At 
the end of the procedure the end of the root was checked on the L5-S1 
site. It appeared to be free. There were still adhesions and it was 
felt unwise to attempt to do a complete neurolysis because of extensive 
adhesions which were present." 
This Operative Procedure note is found twice in the record at pages 112 and 246. 
On admission to the hospital Dr. Smith's diagnosis was: "Focal herniated disk 
L5-S1 in a previously laminectomized site with advised surgical treatment." (See 
Record page 114) His Operative Diagnosis was: "Focal herniated nucleus pulposus on 
the left side at L5-S1". (See Record pages 112 and 146) Based upon his letter of 
October 14, 1988 above he had already determined this was secondary to the original 
industrial injury. After the surgery, however. Dr. Smith changed his primary 
diagnosis and on his August 4, 1989 Discharge summary noted: 
"FINAL DIAGNOSIS: 
1. Adhesive radiculitis L5 root with a focal HNP." 
This appears twice in the Record - on pages 111 and 173. 
Thereafter Dr. Smith wrote two letters with his new diagnosis. In his 
September 12, 1989 letter addressed Mr. Keith's attorney before the Commission he 
stated: 
"This patient had an adhesive radiculitis of the L5 root with a focal 
herniated disc. He was treated by disc excision, partial neurolysis of 
the scars involving the L5 root, and a fusion from L5 to SI." 
This appears on page 4 of the Record. Then on December 4, 1989 in a report 
addressed "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN" he stated: 
"This patient had adhesive radiculitis of the L5 root with a focal 
herniated disc. He was treated by disc excision and partial neurolysis 
and a definitive lumbar fusion from L5 to SI." 
This report appears twice in the Record - on pages 113 and 256. 
The scar tissue around the L5 root did not come from moving the cement bumper, 
it was the unfortunate residual of the prior surgery already determined to have been 
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necessitated by the 1982 injury. Thus, both before and after the surgery, Dr. Smith 
was clear that the current problems and the surgery itself were, on a medical level, 
causally connected to the 1982 industrial injury. 
Only two doctors have expressed opinions as to the etiology of Mr, Keith's 
current problems. Both of them. Dr. MacArthur and Dr. Smith concluded it was 
causally related to the 1982 injury and not the 1988 activities. Without medical 
causation those 1988 activities cannot result in an intervening injury so as to cut 
off Mr. Keith's rights to medical treatment and Temporary Total benefits from the 
1982 employer. The Commission clearly relied solely on the question of Legal 
causation and erred in doing so. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN IGNORING COMPETENT, 
(INCONTROVERTED MEDICAL EVIDENCE THAT THE SURGERY WAS 
RELATED TO THE ORIGINAL 1982 PROBLEM 
The only medical opinions or reports addressing the issue of medical causation 
are those of the treating physician. Dr. Charles Smith, and the physician who 
performed the independent medical evaluation for the State of Utah Dept. of Health, 
Dr. Creig MacArthur. From both we have the same result: The current problems and 
need for surgery were ''secondary to the original problem/' Both doctors make it 
clear in the context of their statements that "the original problem" is the 1982 
industrial injury. The Respondents could have requested their own IME, but opted 
not to do so. 
Thus, while there were un-interpreted statements of history which Respondents 
(laymen, not medical professionals) have taken out of context and tainted with their 
own non-professional interpretations (these will be discussed further below under 
a section entitled Marshalling of Evidence) there is no medically competent 
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statement from any source stating either that the 1989 surgery was not causally 
related to the 1982 injury or that the 1989 surgery was in fact causally related to 
the actiyities of July, 1988. 
The Utah Courts have repeatedly ruled that the Industrial Commission cannot 
ignore competent, uncontroverted evidence. dinger v. Industrial Commission, 571 
P.2d 1328 (Utah 1977); Kent v. Industrial Commission, 57 P.2d 724 (Utah 1936); Jones 
v. California Packing Corp., 244 P.2d 640 (Utah 1952); Baker v. Industrial 
Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965). 
Following the surgerv Dr. Smith dictated his Operative notes in which he 
described the adhesions resulting from the original surgery which has previously 
been adjudicated to have been necessitated as a result of the 1982 injury. Based 
on what he found while "inside" Mr. Keith's back, he changed his diagnosis to 
"Adhesive Radiculitis". No health care professional has questioned that diagnosis 
or even been asked to give a second opinion on it. 
The only way the Industrial Commission could arrive at the conclusion that 
there was a medically causal connection between the 1989 surgerv and Mr. Keith's 
activities in assisting his mother to move or in moving the cement parking bumper, 
and, that there was no medically causal connection between the surgery and the 1982 
industrial injury, is to ignore the medical opinions of Dr. Charles Smith and the 
conclusions of the State of Utah Dept. of Health, arrived at with the assistance of 
Dr. Creig MacArthur. This they did; and this is error. 
POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THE 
ACTIVITY OF MOVING THE PARKING BUMPER WAS UNUSUAL AND 
EXTRAORDINARY EXERTION 
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Under Allen, supra page 13, it is the exertion which must be unusual or 
extraordinary, not the activity itself. In concluding this activity rose to the 
level of "legal causation'' under the Allen decision the Commission exhibits 
confusion on the terminology. There can be numerous unusual or extraordinary 
activities which require little or no physical exertion. In the present case the 
"scooting of the cement bumper was an "unusual and extraordinary" activity. Few of 
us would ever be called upon to move such an object. It does not follow that it 
required unusual or extraordinary exertion. 
The ALJ erroneously concluded unusual and extraordinary exertion was required 
because the task "required" a man and two boys to move it. In his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order the ALJ stated as follows: 
"In the instant case, Mr. Keith was engaged in activity at the time of 
his 1988 injury which was both unusual and extraordinary. The concrete 
barriers used in parking lots against which automobiles park are both 
heavv and difficult to move.' He states that he was "scooting one with 
a bar," and was being helped by his two sons. If a man and two boys 
are required to move such a "block," there can be little doubt that it 
is not an object which can be moved with a moderate amount of effort." 
Oddly enough there is no evidence in the record as to the weight of the cement 
parking bumper. Even if we ignore Mr. Keith's testimony, it is at least as 
consistent with the facts that the Applicant used the bar and obtained the 
assistance of his two sons, both teen agers to make sure that he did not exert 
himself beyond his physical ability, as to conclude the opposite as did the ALJ. 
And Yet the ALJ acknowledges at page 94 of the Record that: 
When I read this conclusionarv statement by the ALJ, noting no evidence in 
the Record to support it, I actually went into the parking lot at my office and 
moved one of the cement parking bumpers by hand, without help, and found it could 
be quite easily done by one individual. If, however, I suffered from a back 
problem, as did Mr. Keith, I would, in caution, seek assistance to move it as he 
did. On this issue I believe Commissioner Carlson is much closer to truth of the 
matter in his dissent than the majority opinion, the ALJ or the claims of the 
Respondents. 
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"Mr. Keith claims that he moved few boxes, and was very careful because 
he was in pain. He stated that he was always careful not to injure 
himself. His testimony at the hearing was all focused on showing that 
he had always been careful in his movements, had consciously avoided 
all lifting of heaving objects out of the light category, and even his 
pushing of the concrete block was minimized by the applicant. With 
regard to the moving of boxes, he indicated that he was cognizant of 
his back limitations and 'could not do much,' and allowed his relatives 
to move his mother's possessions." 
The ALJ further stated in at page 94 of the Record: 
"...[Bloth doctors' MacArthur and Smith relate the cause of the 
accident as being related to exertion in moving heavy objects. The 
doctors assumed unusual and extraordinary exertion rather than that 
associated with ordinary and non-strenuous activities." 
This "Finding" by the judge is not supported by the records of the doctors and 
to jump from this to the conclusion that there was medical causation has already 
been shown as error. In fact Dr. Smiths records state just the opposite is true. 
In his August 9, 1988 note (the one in which he stated he would review the records 
when received from Fireman's Insurance Fund, to determine causation) Dr. Smith 
states: 
"His present herniation occurred while apparently working around 
the house, pushing or pulling, no significant lifting. It appeared to 
be secondary to the activities of associated daily living. The patient 
pushed one piece of cement out of the way in conjunction with several 
other people, "(e.a. ) (Record pages 10, 119 & 253 (all the same 
document.)) 
It was undoubtedly the method of moving the cement bumper with a bar rather 
than bending over and lifting one end, and the assistance of his sons, which caused 
Dr. Smith to conclude he was engaged in normal activities of daily living at least 
as far as exertion was concerned. Considering the method employed and the 
assistance utilized, in the absence of any evidence showing unusual or extraordinary 
exertion, it is clearly error to conclude Mr. Keith exceeded his capabilities in 




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO LIBERALLY INTERPRET THE 
LAW AND RESOLVE DOUBT IN FAVOR OF MR. KEITH IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE MANDATES OF THE APPELLATE COURTS OF THIS STATE 
The Utah Courts have repeatedly held that the compensation statutes should be 
liberally construed in favor of recovery, and that factual doubt respecting the 
right to compensation must be resolved in favor of the injured employee. 
In Chandler \. Industrial Commission, 184 P 1020 (Utah 1919), the Court first 
cited support for the position that "...the Emplovers' Liability Act should be 
liberally construed..." noting that all courts agreed on this question. The Court 
then went on to add: 
"We are all united upon the proposition that in \ie* of the purposes of such 
acts, in case there is any doubt respecting the right to compensation, such 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the employe or of his dependents as the 
case mav be." The Court reversed the Commissions denial of benefits and 
remanded with directions to order benefits. The question of liberal 
construction of the Statutes and that of resolving doubt in favor of the 
employee were thus discussed in separate points by the Court. 
In Ogden City v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 193 P. 857 (Utah 1920), after 
pointing out that the issue of dependency was primarily a question of fact the Court 
stated: 
"The law should be liberally construed in favor of the injured 
workman and his dependents, and 'in case there is any doubt respecting 
the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in favor of 
the emplovee or of his dependents as the case mav be'", (citing 
Chandler, supra, the Court affirmed benefits.) 
In Park Utah Consolidated Miners Co. v. Industrial Commission, 36 P.2d 979 
(Utah 1934), the Court first quoted from Chandler, Supra: 
"If there is anv doubt, 'respecting the right to compensation, 
such doubt should be resolved in favor of the employee or of his 
dependents as the case may be." 
Then several pages later stated: 
"Evidence should be liberally construed in favor of injured workmen and 
their dependents, (citation omitted) and may properly rest upon probabilities, 
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(citation omitted). It need not be direct or positive. Facts mav be 
inferred from circumstances, pro\ided the inference...is reasonable and 
legitimate, (citations omitted)" (e.a.) 
This case involved factual questions as to whether or not the beneficiarv of 
the order for benefits was a 'dependent', whether or not the deceased had 
contributed to her 'support' and whether or not the 'dependent' required 'support'. 
The Court affirmed an award of benefits. 
In Barber Asphalt Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 135 P.2d 266 (Utah 
1943), referring to Park Utah Consolidated Miners Co. case, Supra, the Court again 
quoted other language from Chandler, Supra, page 17, as to resolving doubt in favor 
of the employee and then discussed separately, in another paragraph, the principal 
of liberally construing the statute, saying: 
"With relation to the compensation act it was early held that 
'The Industrial Act, including the procedure therein provided, must be 
liberallv construed, and with the purpose of effecting its beneficent 
and humane objects.'" (citing North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial 
Comm., 58 Utah 486, 200 P. Ill, 112.") 
In Barber the Court added the language "Including the procedure therein 
provided" in it's admonition for liberal construction. An additional award by the 
Commission was affirmed. 
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 140 P. 2d 644 (Utah 1943), the 
Court again discussed both the rule of construction in favor of the injured employee 
and the principle for liberally interpreting the compensation statutes in two 
separate points. On page 646 of the Pacific Reported the Court stated: 
"We have held that the Industrial Act must be liberallv construed 
and that bv such construction we should attempt to effectuate its 
beneficent and humane objects." 
Then almost three pages later, in discussing the facts of the case the Court 
stated: 
"When all of these factors are considered together it makes an 
extremely close case—one very close to the borderline. The Commission 
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resolved the doubt in favor of the applicant. We have previously 
adhered to the rule that doubts respecting the right to compensation 
should be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents." 
The Court sustained the award. 
In McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977), the Court 
stated: 
"A further equally recognized rule of construction resolves any 
doubt respecting the right of compensation in favor of the injured 
employee or his dependents, as the case may be, and the compensation 
statutes should be liberally construed in favor of recovery."(e.a.) 
The Commission had denied compensation. The Supreme Court remanded the case 
for entry of an appropriate award, stating: 
"The order of the Commission is contrary to law in that it fails 
to meet the criteria of statutory construction generally followed and 
to resolve reasonable doubt in favor of the injured plaintiff."(e.a.) 
In Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981), the Court 
stated: 
"Mindful of the 'recognized rule of construction Fthatl resolves 
any doubt respecting the right of compensation in favor of the injured 
employee or his dependents,' and the principle that 'the compensation 
statutes should be liberally construed in favor of recovery,' (citing 
McPhie v. Industrial Commission), we cannot conclude that the 
Commission's finding that applicant's injury and disability resulted 
from an 'accident' was 'arbitrary or capricious' or 'wholly without 
cause' or without 'any substantial evidence' to support it. The 
Commission's order is therefore affirmed." - Note the Commission's 
finding was upheld based upon the rule of construction, not it's 
interpretation of the statute. 
See also: M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948). 
(The Court upheld the award made by the Commission.); Purity Biscuit Co v. 
Industrial Commission, 201 P.2d 961 (Utah 1949). (The Court sustained the award.); 
Kennecott Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 675 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983) (The Court 
affirmed the award of benefits.) 
The foregoing cases are far from exhaustive, but are certainly more than 
adequate to make the point. The Utah Courts have repeatedly ruled that the workers 
compensations statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the employee and 
where there is doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the employee. 
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Where, as here, there are two equally plausible interpretations of a situation 
such as noted in Point III above, there is certainly doubt. Here the Commission 
assumed, without supporting evidence as to the actual difficulty in moving the 
cement bumper, that the use of the bar and assistance of two teenage boys was 
because the task required that amount of assistance and still resulted in unusual 
and extraordinary exertion. The Applicant clearlv testified he was avoiding 
exertion beyond his capabilities. With the use of the bar and his two sons the 
exertion of the task was minimized. Dr. Smith picked up on this. 
Even if evidence were tendered by the Respondents that the cement bumper was 
extraordinarily heavy and required substantial effort to move, by using the bar and 
his two sons the task required no greater exertion than the activities of every day 
living. Certainly this interpretation of the facts is just as reasonable as those 
made by the Commission. When Mr. Keith's testimony is factored in, there is only 
questionable doubt left, if any, as to the validity of the ALJ's finding. This sort 
of doubt should certainly, and, by law must, be resolved in favor of the Applicant. 
The Commission erred in not doing so. 
MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE 
I am constrained to editorialize at the outset that this is an onerous burden 
to place on an Appellee or Petitioner in an adversarial system. To require one 
party to marshall all evidence which may help his opponent under pain of an adverse 
ruling, if he fails to do so adequately, is simply not equitable. This is 
particularly so, where the Respondent is not likewise required to marshall the 
evidence in favor of the Petitioner. This rule adds expense to the system and paper 
to the records and serves no effective purpose. The traditional rebuttal of 
allegations of fact and reasoning in responsive briefs is more economical in cost, 
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time and file space. This said, I make the following submission, pursuant to the 
Court's present requirements. 
There are several references in the Record to "re-injury" of Mr. Keith's back: 
"He re-injured his back, presumably at the same site where his 
prior surgery has been carried out." Record pages 11 and 265 (same 
document) (Dr. Smith). 
"IMPRESSION: Re-injury of lumbar spine. Record page 11 and 265 
(same document) (Dr. Smith). 
"IMPRESSION: Re-injury of the lumbar spine." Record page 106 and 
116 (same document) (Dr. Smith). 
"It is my opinion, based on the studies so far, that he has a 
legitimate re-injury of his lumbar spine with substantial neurological 
findings." Record page 107 (Dr. Smith). 
It might be argued that the term "re-injury" implies a new and separate 
injury. Dr. Smith, however, concluded before surgery that the problems related to 
the original injury and, after surgery, that the primary problem was adhesions from 
the original surgery. Thus his use of the terra "re-injury" must be either a 
preliminary, not yet documented catch-all or a synonym for "aggravation". 
The Respondents argued below (Record page 54) that Dr. Smith's statement that 
Mr. Keith suffered from "adhesive articulitis which supervened following the 
surgical treatment of his herniated disc by Dr. Chester Powell (sic)" (Record page 
4) supported a conclusion of a second "supervening injury". It is clear from Dr. 
Smiths records that the adhesions supervened from the surgical treatment 
necessitated by the 1982 injury and not from some ill-defined supervening "injury" 
in July 1988. Dr. Hooker's notes have been used by the Respondents to support 
their position of a new injury. Dr. Hooker was the Emergency Room doctor seen by 
Mr. Keith on two or three occasions - July 22, 1988, October 26, 1988 and apparently 
August 1, 1988, although the notes on the August 1 visit do not appear to be in the 
Record. The notes on the visit of July 22nd are found on pages 6, 117 and 264 of 
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the Record. After noting the 1982 industrial injury and follow-up, Dr. Hooker makes 
the following entry in his History: 
"Has had no pain in the past several months, maybe up to a year 
and a half. He was lifting a cement slab for somebody yesterday and 
now has pain down the left hip, lumbosacral area and the buttock. 
Doesn't really truly radiate as it did before when he had his disc, he 
states." 
Thereafter on October 26, Dr. Hooker notes "a documented herniated disc" and 
states his Diagnosis as "Back pain - herniated disc". This appears on pages 7, 121 
and 122 of the Record. 
From these comments the Respondents argue a medically causal connection 
between the activities of July, 1988 and the surgery in July of 1989. Dr. Hooker 
states no opinion as to medical causation and his comments, although inconsistent 
with Mr. Keith's testimony, and the history as reported by Dr. Smith, are easily 
reconciled with an aggravation of a pre-existing injury, just as was found by the 
medical panel in 1987 and as concluded by doctors Smith and MacArthur. This is 
particularly so when Dr. Hooker begins his "history" with the comment that Mr. Keith 
had a "long history of back problems." 
Dr. Creig MacArthur's note has been used by the Respondents to support their 
position of a new injury. Dr. MacArthur saw Mr. Keith once to conduct an IME for 
the State of Utah Dept. of Health. In his written notes, found on pages 118 and 248 
of the Record, after noting the 1982 problem, he stated: 
"He has done reasonably well until just recently, more 
particularly in July when, about the 26th, he had a recurrence of his 
symptoms subsequent to a moving-type of injury when he was moving heavy 
objects about. He developed a recurrence of pain in his back, his 
buttock and down his left leg, some into his right leg, that has 
persisted to the present time." 
The ALJ takes the foregoing and makes a conclusion based on negative reasoning 
stating at page 92 of the Record: "Dr. MacArthur did not explicitly state that there 
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was any causal relationship between the 1982 injury and the current injury." This 
is true. Dr. MacArthur also did not explicitly state in this written note that 
there was any causal relationship between the July, 1988 injury and the current need 
for surgery. However, subsequent to his evaluation and dictation of the note relied 
on by the ALJ and the Respondents, the State of Utah Dept. of Health, based on 
recommendations of their medical review panel, on which Dr. MacArthur sat, declined 
payment for the surgery on the ground it was an industrial injury arising out of the 
original problem in 1982. (Record page 17) 
Dr. MacArthur's notes are totally consistent with an aggravation of the prior 
injury as both he and Dr. Smith, in fact, concluded. The ALJ and the Respondents 
simply pull the above comments out of context and interpret them so as to reach an 
opposite conclusion from Dr. Smith and Dr. MacArthur, the professional who made the 
note. 
The Respondents and the ALJ also rely on the notes of Dr. Charles Smith to 
support their interpretation of the medical facts in spite of the fact that Dr. 
Smith repeatedly noted there was a medically causal connection between the 1982 
injury and the surgery in July of 1989 as documented above in Point I. 
In his report of the first visit on August 2, 1988, found at pages 11, 106, 
116 and 249, Dr. Smith stated: 
"His present episode occurred while cleaing (sic) up around his 
apartment doing some furniture moving, etc. He re-injured his back, 
presumably at the same site where his prior surgery has been carried 
out." 
In his report of the second visit on August 9, 1988 (Record pages 10, 119 and 
253), after talking with the claims adjuster for one of the Respondents, Dr. Smith 
recorded: 
"This patient has had a prior laminectomy on the left side at L5-
Sl. There is a focal protrusion posteriorly on the left side. This is 
at the same site where the prior surgery was carried out. A CT Scan 
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done in 1985 revealed a bulging disc but no evidence of focal 
herniation. His present herniation occurred while apparentlv working 
around the house, pushing or pulling, no significant lifting. It 
appeared to be secondary to the activities of associated dailv living. 
The patient pushed one piece of cement out of the wav in conjunction 
with several other people. He did not have acute, immediate pain then 
but he did have pain the following day at which time he went in to the 
Emergencv Room and was seen by Dr. Hooker who then ordered routine 
spine films, medications, and a CT Scan was ordered." 
Thus in his first two visits Dr. Smith notes the acti\ities of Julv, 1988. 
He thereafter, after reviewing Mr. Keith's history fully concluded his need for 
surgery "appears to be secondary to the original problem." 
In his admission statement prior to surgerv on July 27, 1989 (pages 114 and 
245 if the Record) Dr. Smith stated: 
"His historv dates back to about 1982 at which time he had a 
laminectomv with an excision of a herniated disk and did reasonably 
well in the interval up until 1988 in Julv when he was doing a lot of 
moving of boxes and so on when they v>ere moving from one site to 
another. The combination of lifting and twisting with repetitive 
bending apparentlv was the underlying cause for the problem." 
It should be noted this is after he has made the conclusion reported in the 
October 14, 1988 letter that there is a medically causal connection between the 
present problems and need for surgerv and the original 1982 industrial injurv. 
During the surgery and after Dr. Smith made the connection even stronger bv pointing 
up the adhesions resulting from the original surgery and changing his diagnosis to 
"adhesive radiculitis". 
There is no medical opinion from any source which challenges either Dr. 
MacArthur's (and the State Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing) 
or Dr. Smith's conclusions that the surgery was causally connected to and 
necessitated b\ the original industrial injury in 1982. 
Finallv, there are a series of assumption apparently made by the ALJ and 
incorporated into his Findings which cannot be supported by the Record, but which 
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are taken by the Respondents as establishing additional facts upon which they hang 
their arguments. 
The ALJ found on page 93 of the Record that: 
"In the instant case, Mr. Keith was engaged in activity at the 
time of the 1988 injury which was both unusual and extraordinary. The 
concrete barriers used in parking lots against which automobiles park 
are both heavy and difficult to move. He states that he was 'scooting 
one with a bar,' and was being helped by his two sons. If a man and 
two boys are required to move such a 'block* there can be little doubt 
that it is not an object which can be moved with a moderate amount of 
effort." (e.a.) 
There is no evidence in the record as to the weight or size of the cement 
bumper or as to any difficulty in moving them. Admittedly we have all seen them in 
parking lots and common experience tells us they may be heavy and awkward to move, 
but the actual weight and difficulty are left purely to conjecture. 
As to the judges Finding that "If a man and two boys are required to move such 
a 'block' there can be little doubt that it is not an object which can be moved with 
a moderate amount of effort.", I can only point out the obvious: Even a difficult 
task, with adequate help and the proper tools., can require a minimum amount of 
effort. This is how Mr. Keith reported it and this is how Dr. Smith saw it in his 
August 9, 1988 note. 
The ALJ's finding on page 95 of the Record that: 
"The medical reports of Doctors' Smith and MacArthur show that 
Mr. Keith had done reasonably well prior to the 1988 events, and it was 
only because of his strenuous exertion that he reinjured his 
back."(e.a.) 
is in direct conflict with the conclusions of both doctors. The term "strenuous 
exertion" in particular is extraneous to the Record. The strongest wording used by 
any of the doctors in the record was: 
Dr. Hooker from his July 22, 1988 entry: "He was lifting a cement 
slab for somebody". Most likely this is in error but even so there is 
no comment as to "strenuous exertion". 
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Dr. MacArthur from his only written note: "moving type of injury 
when he was moving heavy objects about." No comment as to how heavy 
and certainly no statement identifying "strenuous exertion". 
Dr. Smith from his admission note: "[Hie was doing a lot of 
moving of boxes and so on.... The combination of lifting and twisting 
with repetitive bending apparently was the underlying cause for the 
problem." 
His other notes made contemporaneously with his first and second 
visits state: "cleaning up around his apartment doing some furniture 
moving, etc." and "working around the house, pushing or pulling, no 
significant lifting. It appeared to be secondary to the activities of 
associated daily living. The patient pushed one piece of cement out of 
the way in conjunction with several other people." 
How the ALJ reasoned from this to "strenuous exertion" is hard to comprehend. 
Finally the ALJ concluded on page 96 of the Record that the 
"Medical evidence shows that the applicant knowingly and 
willingly greatly exceeded his physical limitations by engaging in 
unusual and extraordinarily strenuous activities".(e.a.) 
Now the ALJ has made the additional leap to "knowingly and willingly greatly 
exceed(ing) his physical limitations by engaging in unusual and extraordinarily 
strenuous activities." No where in the Record is such a quantum leap supported by 
fact or logic. This conclusionary assumption, stated as fact, is, in fact, contrary 
to the medical evidence, contrary to Mr. Keith's testimony and contrary to the 
opinions of the medical professionals involved in the case. 
In addition, it is totally irrelevant since the pivotal issue of the case is 
medical causation and the only evidence as to medical causation is that the 1982 
industrial injury necessitated the surgery of July, 1989 as stated by the only two 
health care professionals giving an opinion on the subject. 
The evidence marshalled, claimed by the Respondents and relied on by the ALJ, 
at best, implies that the moving of the cement bumper, if any benefit of doubt is 
given to the Employer, could, arguably, be elevated to a status of legal causation. 
From the evidence, however, it is clear that the argument is tenuous at best and 
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given a resolution of doubt in favor of Mr. Keith, most certainly fails. Further, 
the activities of July, 1988 may have aggravated Mr. Keith's original injury, but 
there is no evidence in the Record, either pointed out by Respondents, relied upon 
by the ALJ or found by this attorney, which counters the medical opinions of Dr. 
Charles Smith or Dr. Creig MacArthur to the effect that the surgery was medically 
necessitated by the industrial injury of 1982. 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Charles Smith, after reviewing the records, concluded the current 
problems were secondary to the original industrial injury. Dr. Creig MacArthur 
reported to the State of Utah Dept. of Health and based on his report that agency 
denied assistance for the surgery on the ground that it was necessitated by the 
original 1982 injury and was thus the responsibility of the "Industrial Commission". 
During the surgery Dr. Smith noted and attempted to free up extensive 
adhesions in the site of the original surgery. Following the surgery he changed his 
primary diagnosis to "Adhesive Radiculitis". 
Both health care providers who expressed opinions as to medical causation were 
in agreement that there was medical causation between the present problems and need 
for surgery and the original industrial injury in 1982. No medical "opinion" to the 
contrary can be found in the record. There is clearly a causal connection between 
the surgery and the 1982 industrial injury. The Industrial Commission may not 
ignore such competent and uncontroverted evidence. 
The "scooting" of the cement bumper may have been an "unusual and 
extraordinary" activity, but performed with an appropriate tool and with more than 
adequate help it did not require unusual or extraordinary exertion. There was thus 
no legal causation. 
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Any doubt should have been resolved in Mr. Keith's favor. The Industrial 
Commission clearly erred. The matter should be reversed remanded to the Commission 
for appropriate findings and order for pavment of medicals and temporary total 
benefits. 
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35-1-45 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
pensable as "accidental" injury within this sec-
tion since in order to recover for accidental 
injury there must be some causal connection or 
relation between act causing injury and em-
ployment or duties of injured employee. 
Westerdahl v. State Ins. Fund, 60 Utah 325, 
208 P. 494 (1922). 
Although an employee is employed on the 
day of an accident, it cannot be said he is in the 
course of his employment where he steps aside 
to engage in an altercation with some third 
person concerning a personal grievance wholly 
unrelated to matters connected with his em-
ployment. Wilkerson v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 
Utah 355, 266 P. 270 (1928). 
Wife of deceased drugstore employee was not 
entitled to compensation where she did not 
sustain burden of proving that typhoid fever 
was result of injury received in course of his 
employment. Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 
Utah 141, 17 P.2d 205 (19321 
Death of beer truck driver after being taken 
to the hospital when he had a severe pain in his 
chest after making his second morning delivery 
did not result from an accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment, where sub-
stance of opinions of medical panel was that 
death from coronary thrombosis with myocar-
dial infarction was not caused from the exertion 
of deceased's work on that morning. Burton v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 353, 374 P.2d 
439 (1962). 
Regular course of employment. 
Bricklayer killed in automobile accident 
while returning home from work was not killed 
in an accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment despite fact that decedent's hourly 
wage had been increased due to location of 
construction site; increased hourly wage did not 
constitute pay for travel time. Barney v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 R2d 1271 
(1973). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation 
§ 1. 
AJL.R. — Suicide as compensable under 
Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A.L.R.3d 616. 
Workmen's compensation: injury or death 
due to storms, 42 A.L.R.3d 385. 
Workmen's compensation: injury sustained 
while attending employer-sponsored social af-
fair as arising out of and in the course of 
employment, 47 A.L.R.3d 566. 
Employer's liability for injury caused by food 
or drink purchased by employee in plant facili-
ties, 50 A.L.R.3d 505. 
Workers' compensation law as precluding 
employee's suit against employer for third per-
son's criminal attack, 49 A.L.R.4th 926. 
Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as 
compensable, 52 A.L.R.4th 731. 
Workers' compensation: iryuries incurred 
during labor activity, 61 A.L.R.4th 196. 
Workers' compensation: usuries incurred 
while traveling to or from work with employer's 
receipts, 63 A.L.R.4th 253. 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
®=>47. 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be 
paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and 
in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident 
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibiUty for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its 
insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1; 1988, ch. 
vice, as affected by compensation, § 35-6-1 et 
seq. 
Orcnnational diseases erenerallv. Chanter 2 of 
State average weekly wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66%% of that 
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum 
of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, 
not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, 
but not to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks 
at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
over a period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee 
reaching a fixed state of recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability benefits 
shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in Chapters 1 and 2 of 
this title shall be determined by the commission as follows: on or before June 
1 of each year, the total wages reported on contribution reports to the 
department of employment security under the commission for the preceding 
calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of insured 
workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the 
preceding year by twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall be 
divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus determined rounded to the 
nearest dollar. The state average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for injuries or 
disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the 
twelve-month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, 
and any death resulting therefrom. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 
§ 3137; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; 1921, ch. 67, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 
R.S. 1933, 42-1-61; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, 68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 3; 
ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-61; L. 1945, ch. 65, 1971, ch. 76, § 4; 1973, ch. 67, § 2; 1975, ch. 
§ 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, 101, § 4; 1977, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 287, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS weeks' compensation for loss of arm under 
. . § 35-1-66 as well as compensation for tempo-
Constitutionality. rary total disability under this section, and 
Construction and application.
 a w a r d w a g for 2 0 0 w e e k g , c o m pensation; corn-
Effect of voluntary payments. mission considered payments as compensation 
Estoppel. due for temporary disability under this section. 
Findings of commission. Buckingham IVansp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
Limitations.
 9 3 U t a h 3 4 2 > ? 2 R 2 d 1 0 7 ? ( 1 9 3 7 ) 
Maximum benefits. 
Maximum time. Estoppel, 
Operation and effect. Fact that insurance carrier pays compensa-
Overpayment of benefits. tion for temporary total disability does not 
Reclassification of disability. preclude it from denying that applicant for 
Stabilization of condition. compensation met with an accident which 
Temporary total disability. caused his death. Taggert v. Industrial 
Validity of award. Comm'n, 79 Utah 598, 12 P.2d 356 (1932). 
Constitutionality. Findings of commission. 
This section does not violate the open courts Order of Industrial Commission denying ad-
provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, ditional compensation on ground workman had 
§ 11. Middlestadt v. Indus. Comm'n, 852 R2d n o t become totally and permanently disabled 
1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). s i n c e on&n*1 finding and award for temporary 
disability was affirmed, although medical testi-
Construction and application. mony was in conflict, and since failure to re-
expenses — Artificial means and appliances. 
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this chapter the employer or 
the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable sums for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial means, appliances, and 
prostheses necessary to treat the injured employee. 
(2) If death results from the injury, the employer or the insurance earner 
shall pay the burial expenses in ordinary cases as established by rule. 
(3) If a compensable accident results in the breaking of or loss of an 
employee's artificial means or appliance including eyeglasses, the employer or 
insurance carrier shall provide a replacement of the artificial means or 
appliance.
 # 
(4) The commission may require the employer or insurance carrier to 
maintain the artificial means or appliances or provide the employee with a 
replacement of any artificial means or appliance for the reason of breakage, 
wear and tear, deterioration, or obsolescence. 
(5) The commission may, in unusual cases, order the payment of additional 
sums for burial expenses or to provide for artificial means or appliances as the 
commission considers just and proper. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 86; CJL 1917, 
§ 3147; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-
75; L. 1941 (1st S.S.), ch. 15, § 1; C. 1943, 
42-1-75; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 
1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 
62, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 10; 
1971, ch. 76, § 9; 1975, ch. 101, § 8; 1977, ch. 
156, § 11; 1984, ch. 78, § 1; 1992, ch. 178, § 4; 
1994, ch. 224, § 9. 




Compensable subsequent injury. 
Employee's additional insurance. 
Employment of physician by employee. 
Extraordinary cases. 
Medical expenses. 
No apportionment of insurer's liability. 
Order of commission. 
Statute of limitations. 
Validity. 
Application. 
This section does not require that employee 
file special application for allowance of medical 
expenses in excess of $500 if he has on file a 
claim for compensation generally, and he need 
not ask for such relief in his regular claim. 
Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
93 Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937); Anderson v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 108 Utah 52, 157 R2d 253 
(1945). 
Obligation to pay compensation under this 
section is governed by the law at the time the 
injury occurred. Utah Constr. Co. v. Matheson, 
534 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1975). 
Chiropractic treatment. 
Claimant was entitled to continued chiro-
r ment, effective April 27, 1992, rewrote the 
l  provisions of the former first and second undes-
i ignated paragraphs and designated them as 
L; Subsections (1) through (3); deleted the former 
L. third through fifth undesignated paragraphs, 
>; relating to replacement of artificial means or 
u appliances and to payments of additional sums; 
i and added Subsections (4) and (5). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
made stylistic changes in Subsection (1). 
States Casing Serv. v. McKean, 706 P.2d 601 
(Utah 1985). 
Employee's additional insurance. 
Neither employer nor his insurance carrier 
was excused from additional liability imposed 
by this section because employee carried other 
accident insurance, where award and employ-
ee's insurance taken together did not exceed 
medical, nurse and hospital services actually 
incurred. Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n, 108 
Utah 52, 157 P.2d 253 (1945). 
Employment of physician by employee. 
If injured employee himself employs a physi-
cian to attend him, and he is not negligent in 
seeking or employing such physician, but due to 
erroneous diagnosis employee has all of his 
teeth unnecessarily extracted, he may recover 
therefor as being attributable to the accident or 
injury, and not due to an independent and 
intervening cause; at least where employer 
knew that the employee had been injured and 
was being treated, and employer was content 
with treatment. Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 73 Utah 535, 275 P. 777 (1929). 
Extraordinary cases. 
Upon proper application to the Industrial 
Commission, the employer is entitled to some 
limitations and definiteness in regard to the 
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